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CIVIL PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW

Six significant cases testing the limits of federal court jurisdiction
came before the Tenth Circuit during this survey term. A dispute
originating in Utah between an oil company and an Indian tribe over oil
and gas leases required delineation of the limits of tribal court sovereignty and the availability of the federal courts to a non-Indian plaintiff.'
An action by several aliens challenging deportation practices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service limited the original jurisdiction of
the circuit courts of appeals under section 106(a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act 2 . The personal jurisdiction cases for the term raised
the questions of whether federal court diversity jurisdiction over necessary third parties can reach out of the forum state, 3 and whether a dis-4
trict court can inquire into its jurisdiction over parties sua sponte.
Intervention was denied a party whose interests were not sufficiently coterminous with those of the litigants in a case, resolving an apparent
conflict in prior Tenth Circuit analyses of the interest requirement for
intervention of right. 5 Finally, a state court's determination and enforcement of the statute of limitations against a section 1983 civil rights
6
plaintiff was accorded res judicata effect.
I.

LIMITS OF INDIAN TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION:
SUPERIOR OIL CO. v. UNITED STATES

A.

Facts

Superior Oil filed a complaint in federal district court arising from a
dispute between it and the Navajo Indian Tribe over oil and gas leases
granted by the tribe to Superior's predecessors in interest. 7 Sole authority to regulate oil and gas exploration on the tribal reservation was
claimed by Superior to be vested in the Secretary of the Interior, preempting regulatory control by the tribe. Superior contended that the
tribe intentionally sought to deprive it of property interests in the oil
and gas leases by refusing to grant permits allowing seismic operations.
Superior further alleged that the sole reason for the refusal was to cause
the leases to expire, so that the tribe could negotiate new leases on more
favorable terms. The tribe moved for summary judgment and dismissal
1. Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 674 (D. Colo. 1985), rev'd, 798
F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1986).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982); Salehi v. District Director, INS, 575 F. Supp. 1237 (D.
Colo. 1983), rev'd, 796 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. Quinones v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. Williams v. Life Sa. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1986).
5. FDIC v. Jennings, 816 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1987).
6. DeVargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1986).
7. Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 674 (D. Colo. 1985), rev'd, 798
F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1986).
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asserting that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and that
its sovereign immunity shielded it from suit. 8 The district court dismissed the case agreeing that the determination of whether to issue seismic permits was within the tribe's sovereign authority. The court,
therefore, did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Superior's
claim. 9
B.

The Tenth Circuit's Holding

The Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Superior's complaint
relying on National Farmer's Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,10
which was handed down after the district court's decision. Although 28
U.S.C. § 133111 empowers a federal district court to review the federal
question of whether a tribe's action has exceeded the limits of its sovereign authority, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in
reaching the question of whether the tribe's sovereign immunity
shielded it from suit, without first requiring Superior to exhaust its claim
in tribal court. 12 National Farmers was quoted for the proposition that
exhaustion of tribal remedies is not required where tribal authority is
asserted in bad faith. The court then held that Superior's claims concerning the tribe's motives for withholding the seismic permits were allegations of bad faith which, if proven, would be sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the district court before all tribal court remedies were
13
exhausted.
C.

Background

Two obstacles must be overcome to challenge a tribe's assertion of
its sovereign powers in a federal court action. The tribe's sovereign immunity must be circumvented, and the question presented must be one
over which a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction.
1. Tribal Sovereignty
Indian tribes preceded the United States as North American political entities. 14 Tribal sovereignty (and its concomitant power of selfgovernment) is recognized as inherent15by virtue of the tribes' existence
as independent political communities.
Limits are placed on tribal soy8. 605 F. Supp. at 676-77.
9. Id. at 686. The United States contended that it had no authority over the granting
of seismic permits, and therefore the suit was dismissed on the ground that there was no
case or controversy involving it. The Tenth Circuit did not address the question of the
government's dismissal. 798 F.2d 1324, 1331.
10. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
11. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
12. Superior Oil, 798 F.2d at 1329.

13. Id. at 1330-31.
14. See generally Russell, The Influence of Indian Confederations on the Union of the American
Colonies, 22J. AM. HIST. 53 (1928).

15. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).

See also F. Cohen,

COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, 229-252 (1982). Cohen's book is the classical
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ereignty because of the protectorate relationship existing between the
United States and Indian tribes. 16 The limits derive from tribes' incorporation within United States territory and acceptance of its protection,
federal statutes (which evidence Congress' plenary control over tribal
sovereignty) 17 and treaties where sovereign powers have been given up
voluntarily. ' 8
Shaped through treaties, federal statutes, and to a lesser extent judicial decisions, tribal sovereignty over Indians includes the right to determine tribe membership, ' 9 and jurisdiction to try and punish Indians
for criminal offenses committed on Indian lands, the power to legislate,
and the right to determine the form of tribal government.2 0 The power
over non-Indians is more narrowly defined. It includes the power to
exclude persons from tribal territory. 2 some degree ofjurisdiction over
civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians, and various other powers derived from inherent sovereignty which have not been withdrawn
by treaty, statute or as a result of the Indians' dependent status on the
United States. 22 The extent of this jurisdiction has not been "fully
23
determined."
For some time after the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968,24 several tribes purported to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. 2 5 In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,2 6 the Supreme
Court held that Indian tribes cannot try non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country. 2 7 The Court held that tribal power to try nonIndians is inconsistent with Indian tribes' submission to the overriding
28
sovereignty of the United States.
work in the area of federal Indian Law, and is recognized as authoritative by the courts.
See, e.g., Nat l Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 855 n. 17; Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 139 nn.6, 8 (1982); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 199 n.9
(1978).
16. See F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 234; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557. See generally
Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 89 (1978).
17. Conquest of tribes by the United States rendered them subject to its legislative
power. See F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 241.
18. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
19. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); F. COHEN, SUpra note 10, at
248.
20. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194-96. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 247-49.
21. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
22. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. See also Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191. See generally McCoy, The
Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty, 13 HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357 (1978); Collins, Implied Limitations on the TerritorialJurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1979).
23. F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 253. See generally Note, Implication of Civil Remedies Under
the Indian Civil Rights Act, 75 MICH. L. REV. 210 (1976).
24. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982)).
25. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.
26. Id. Oliphant was a non-Indian resident of the reservation. He was arrested by
tribal authorities at an annual tribal celebration and charged with assaulting a tribal officer
and resisting arrest. Id. at 194.
27. "Indian country" has been defined as "all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation .... ", 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982).
28. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. The Court's conclusions on tribal authority were based
largely on congressional, executive and lower federal court opinions which hold that tribal
courts do not have the power to try non-Indians. Id. at 206. Justice Rehnquist's majority
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Two recent Supreme Court cases have helped delineate the authority of Indian tribes to exercise jurisdiction over civil disputes between
Indians and non-Indians. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes,29 the Colville tribal government refused to collect a Washington state sales tax on
cigarettes sold on the reservation. Instead, the tribe collected a smaller
tribal tax, enabling merchants on the reservation to undercut the prices
of non-reservation competitors, with the result that non-Indians living
nearby came to the reservation to buy cigarettes.3 0 The tribe argued
that the practice was justified because the revenue generated enabled it
to provide necessary governmental services to tribal members on the
reservation. 3 ' The Court rejected this argument, holding that the price
differential achieved by refusing to collect the state tax was not generated by activities on the reservation in which the tribe had a significant
interest; therefore, the action was not part of the inherent sovereignty
32
retained by the tribe.
The "significant interest" test was also employed in Montana v.
United States,3 3 where the issue was the authority of the Crow Tribe to
regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on reservation lands owned
by non-Indians.3 4 Recognizing that a tribe retains inherent civil authority over the actions of non-Indians when those actions threaten or directly affect the political or economic security of the tribe, the Court
held that the hunting and fishing rights in question were not of sufficient
35
importance to justify the tribe's exercise of its sovereignty over them.
As part of tribal sovereignty, Indian tribes possess the traditional
common-law sovereign immunity from suit, similar to that enjoyed by
the United States.36 The immunity is subject to Congress' plenary control and may be expressly waived by Congress, or in limited situations,
3
by the tribe itself.

7

Tribal sovereignty was considered in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,38
opinion contains an excellent historical outline of all three branches' views on the subject.
Id. at 197-206.
29. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
30. Id. Similar taxes on motor vehicles were challenged as well.
31. Id. at 154. The Court found that the tribes did have the sovereign power to collect
their own taxes on the reservation, but the tribal power to tax did not oust the state's
taxation power. Id. at 152, 155.
32. Id. at 155. The tribe based its challenge on federal statute, policies favoring tribal
self-government, and the Indian Commerce Clause, all of which were discussed and found
unsupportive of the tribe's position.
33. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
34. Id. at 547.
35. Id. at 566. The Court overturned the Ninth Circuit's holding which stated that
inherent sovereignty, and United States treaties with the Crow Tribe in combination with
the federal trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982), both afforded the tribe regulatory
power over the disputed hunting and fishing rights. Montana v. United States, 604 F.2d
1162 (1979).
36. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58; F. COHEN, supra note 10, at 324.
37. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58; F. COHEN, supra, note 10, at 325-27.
38. 436 U.S. 49. Respondent Martinez brought suit challenging a tribal rule that excluded her children from membership in the tribe because their father was not a member.
Id. at 52-53. The district court and Tenth Circuit both reached the merits of respondent's
claim. The district court ruled that the tribe's membership rules did not violate the equal
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an action brought by a member of the Pueblo against the Pueblo and its
officers individually. The Court held that sovereign immunity protected
the tribe, but did not extend to its officers. 39 In analyzing Santa Clara
Pueblo, the Tenth Circuit relied on the principle that tribal immunity extends to its officers when the tribe's power to perform the action complained of is not disputed because the tribe has the necessary authority
to act. 40 Where the sovereign's authority to make or enforce the law
under which the official act is attacked, however, the official is subject to
4
suit. 1

Because of the potential for injustice in disputes between a tribe
and a non-Indian where the tribe refuses access to its courts and asserts
its sovereign immunity to suit in federal court, a narrow exception to
sovereign immunity as described in Santa Clara Pueblo4 2 has developed.
This exception was promulgated in the Tenth Circuit's Dry Creek Lodge,
Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes 43 decision. The Dry Creek Lodge was
closed by the tribe after a tribe member complained that the access road
to the lodge infringed on his property. The tribal court refused to hear
the lodge owners' case. Next, the lodge initiated a suit against the tribe
in federal district court which was dismissed pursuant to the tribe's assertion of its immunity to suit. 44 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding

that sovereign immunity 4 5 should not be applied to leave a plaintiff
46
without a forum.
2.

Federal Jurisdiction over Civil Disputes Between Indians and
Non-Indians

Determining whether the exercise ofjurisdiction by a tribal court is
protection language in the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws . . ."), because the tribe was best situated to
balance the competing interests of those seeking membership, with its own interests in
preserving its cultural identity by controlling tribe membership. 402 F. Supp. 5, 18-19
(D.N.M. 1975). The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the tribe's interest in controlling
its membership was not sufficient to justify the sexual discrimination inherent in the membership rules. 540 F.2d 1039, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 1976). On appeal the Supreme Court
held that the equal protection clause of the ICRA did not expressly or impliedly waive the
tribe's sovereign immunity; therefore, the tribe was competent to assert its immunity to
bar respondent's action. 436 U.S. at 58, 60-73.
39. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59.
40. Tenneco v. Sac and Fox Tribe, 725 F.2d 572, 574 (10th Cir. 1984).
41. Id. The fact situation in Tenneco bears a close resemblance to that in SuperiorOil. In
Tenneco, the Sac and Fox Tribe attempted to impose new taxes and licensing requirements
on oil and gas leases held by Tenneco and its predecessors in interest for over 50 years.
725 F.2d at 573-74. Like Superior, Tenneco bypassed tribal remedies for federal court.
The Tenth Circuit held that there was federal question jurisdiction and remanded the case
to the district court for a determination of the sovereign immunity issue. Id. at 574-75.
Exhaustion of tribal remedies was not an issue because Tenneco was decided before Nat '
Farmer's. 471 U.S. at 845.
42. 436 U.S. 49, 58. See also supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
43. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980).
44. Id. at 683-84.
45. 436 U.S. 49, 58. The tribal sovereign immunity set forth in Santa Clara Pueblo is
the traditional common law immunity, subject to Congress' power to waive it.
46. Dry Creek Lodge, 623 F.2d at 685.
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lawful requires analysis of the limits of tribal sovereignty. 4 7 Petitioners
in NationalFarmers successfully argued that because federal law regulates
tribal sovereignty, questions relating to the limits of that sovereignty are
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 48 Specifically, petitioners
took the position that the right to be protected against an unlawful exercise of tribal jurisdiction has its source in federal law. 4 9
A grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction in the civil area by the National Farmer's court, as the Oliphant court granted in the criminal area,
would have foreclosed tribal court jurisdiction over claims involving
non-Indians. 50 Owing to the lack of a congressional pronouncement on
tribal exercise of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, and the government's larger interest in protecting the rights at stake in criminal cases
than in civil controversies, Oliphant was distinguished, enabling the NationalFarmer's court to hold that tribal court civil jurisdiction is not automatically foreclosed. 5 1 Instead, tribal authority to exercise jurisdiction
over civil disputes involving non-Indians is first determined in the tribal
court. In making the determination, the tribal court must conduct a
careful analysis to determine that tribal sovereignty in the subject area
has not been divested by treaties, executive branch policies, or judicial
52
decisions.
The requirement that tribal remedies be exhausted before a federal
court will review the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction has an analogue. Federal courts refuse to take jurisdiction of claims alleging violations of constitutional rights in a state court proceeding, or as a result of
the enforcement of a state statute, when the complaining party has an
opportunity to present those claims in a state court. 53 Situations where
exhaustion of tribal remedies is not required derive from the same analogy. Where the exercise of tribal sovereign authority (by its courts or
otherwise) is "motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad
faith," or where exhaustion would otherwise be futile, exhaustion of
54
remedies is not required.
47. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The Court
evaluated the tribe's retained inherent powers to determine its ability to try a non-Indian
for a crime committed in Indian country.
48. National Farmer's Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
850-51 (where petitioners' claim of federal jurisdiction was founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982)).

See supra note 10.

49. Nal Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 851. The Court reasoned that the jurisdiction question
is a federal issue, because the Indian tribe's power to exert civil jurisdiction over a party is
dependent on whether federal law has divested the tribe of that power. Id. at 852.
50. Id. at 854.
51. Id. The Court also relied on an 1855 advisory opinion by Attorney General Cushing, 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 175, 179-181 (1855), stating that Congress had only divested the
tribes ofjurisdiction in the criminal area.
52. Natl Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 855-56.
53. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
54. Vat'l Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (quotingJuidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)
where theJuidice Court stated that the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
do not apply where exhaustion of state remedies for alleged Constitutional violations
would be futile).
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D. Analysis

The standard that applies to determinations of whether a tribal
court's exercise of jurisdiction over a dispute involving non-Indians is
lawful is the "significant interest" test. 5 5 In Superior Oil, the Tenth Circuit followed the reasoning set forth in National Farmer's, by holding that
the first opportunity to determine the significance of the tribe's interest
in its dispute with Superior rested with the tribe. 56 The court noted that
the extent of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians is not well-defined, and that the requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies 57 provides a method of determining that jurisdiction in a manner consistent
with the "significant interest" test. 5 8 Congress' policy of encouraging
tribal self-government, 59 and the value of the tribal court record in reviewing the significance of the tribe's interest 6° were also cited as favoring an initial tribal court determination of its authority over the
61
dispute.
Due to Superior's allegation of bad faith on the tribe's part, the
Tenth Circuit had occasion to apply the exception of the exhaustion of
tribal remedies requirement set forth in National Farmer's.62 This exception apparently applies only to the extent of allowing a non-Indian plaintiff to take its dispute directly to federal district court. National Farmer's
does not explicitly address what effect a tribal assertion of sovereign immunity to the federal court proceedings would have following the finding of a bad faith assertion of tribal jurisdiction over a claim. However,
a review of the range of possible outcomes to the tribe's assertion of
sovereign immunity verifies that the process 63 set forth in National
Farmer's will not deny the non-Indian plaintiff a forum to air his
complaint.
In one situation, the (non-Indian) plaintiff's complaint poses a challenge (which a federal district court is able to entertain because one of
the National Farmer's requirements has been satisfied 6 4) to some tribal
action as being outside the bounds of its sovereignty. Tenneco 65 and
55.

See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.

56. Superior Oil, 798 F.2d 1324, 1329. The Tenth Circuit also held that the district
court could review the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction under federal question jurisdiction. See Nat'l Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 852-53.
57. Natl Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 857.
58. Superior Oil, 798 F.2d at 1329.

59. See Nail Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 856; New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324, 332 (1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138; Washington v.
Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134.
60.
7atl
Farmer's, 471 U.S. at 856-57.
61. In light of the Tenth Circuit's observation that the reach of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians is "far from determined," SuperiorOil, 798 F.2d at 1329, the value of
tribal court guidance in evaluating the significance of the tribe's interest is all the more
apparent.
62. 471 U.S. at 856 n.21. See also supra text accompanying note 47.
63. See SuperiorOil, 798 F.2d at 1329. Nat'l Farmer's detailed the processes to evaluate
the reach and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.

65. 725 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1984).
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Santa Clara Pueblo66 stand for the proposition that where the validity of a
law under which a tribal officer purported to act is challenged, the officer is liable for the action, even though the tribe itself can successfully
assert sovereign immunity. 67 In this situation, the federal courts serve
as the final forum for relief.
In another situation, where the plaintiff is forced to concede that
the tribe has the authority to act, Santa Clara Pueblo seems to foreclose
access to a federal forum because the tribal officers are shielded by sovereign immunity. 68 If the tribe refuses to open its courts to the plaintiff,
Dry Creek Lodge 69 comes into play. Dry Creek Lodge provides a narrow exception to the holding announced in Santa Clara Pueblo in that a nonIndian can sue a tribe in federal court when there would otherwise be no
forum to adjudicate the controversy. 70 If the tribal court takes jurisdiction over the dispute, its decision is final. The review mechanism of National Farmer's7 1 is inapposite, because by hypothesis, the tribe's action
72
giving rise to the dispute is concededly within its sovereign powers.
Its courts, therefore, have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the
dispute.
The final situation to consider is dismissal of a case by the federal
district court, pursuant to National Farmer's,73 because the plaintiff has
not exhausted all tribal remedies. Subsequent refusal by the tribal court
to adjudicate the dispute presumably triggers the Dry Creek exception to
Santa Clara Pueblo in order to avoid leaving the plaintiff without a forum.7 4 Thus, although narrow, the Dry Creek exception serves as a safety
net for plaintiffs who would otherwise be left without a remedy by the
National Farmer's strict holding.
II.

APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT:

SALEHI

v.

106(A) OF

THE

DISTRICT

DIRECTOR, I.N. S.

A.

Facts

In a consolidated action, petitioners Salehi, Lahigani, and
Hakimzadeh, all Iranian citizens living illegally in the United States, filed
habeas corpus petitions in United States District Court after being arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 75 The
66. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
67. Tenneco, 725 F.2d at 574.
68. Id.
69. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
70. 623 F.2d at 685. See also supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
72. The facts in Dry Creek Lodge provide an example of this situation. There the plaintiffs did not allege that the tribe did not have the authority to close the lodge, but that the
tribe member's complaint resulting in the closure was without foundation. Dry Creek Lodge,
623 F.2d at 683-84.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
74.

Dry Creek Lodge, 623 F.2d at 685.

75. Salehi v. District Director, INS, 575 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd, 796 F.2d
1286 (10th Cir. 1986).
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court granted preliminary injunctions restraining the INS from detaining petitioners pending resolution of their claims. Petitioners claimed
the right to apply for asylum, and the affirmative right not to be deported if section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act),76
or article 33 of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 77 were
satisfied. They also alleged they had been denied due process of law
because INS regulations failed to provide for a stay of deportation and
automatic hearing upon application for asylum. Petitioner Salehi contended that INS denial of his application for a stay of deportation constituted an abuse of discretion. 78 The district court dismissed the action
79
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under section 106(a) of the Act.
B.

The Tenth Circuit's Holding

The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's jurisdiction over
both the habeas writ and petitioners' requests for declaratory relief.8 0
The court held that section 106(a) of the Act did not operate to vest
exclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals because the petitioners did
not directly challenge the validity of a final order of deportation. Since
the district court was held to have jurisdiction over the general claims,
the Tenth Circuit did not address the types of claims for relief that could
be entertained in an action based exclusively on habeas corpus. 8 ' The
district court also had jurisdiction over Salehi's abuse of discretion claim
because again, the claim did not constitute a direct challenge to the va82
lidity of the final order of deportation outstanding against him.
C.

Background

In section 106(a), Congress provided for the judicial review of final
orders of deportation entered by the INS pursuant to hearings authorized under section 242(b) of the Act.8 3 The review procedure of section
106(a) vests exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of final deportation orders of the INS in the United States Courts of Appeals. 84 This judicial
review mechanism is the method by which final orders of other adminis76.

"The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ...

to a country if the

Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such

country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982).
77. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1968, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6276,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
78. Salehi, 575 F. Supp at 1238-9. See generally Eligibility for Withholding of Deportation:
The Alien's Burden Under the 1980 Refugee Act, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1193 (1983).

79. Section 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982), provides that the United States Courts
of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation entered pursuant to administrative proceedings conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982).
80. Salehi, 796 F.2d at 1289.
81.

Id.

82. Id. at 1290, 1292.
83. "A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to determine the deportability of any alien, and . . . [and] shall make determinations, including
orders of deportation." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982).
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1982). 28 U.S.C. § 2342
provides for circuit court jurisdiction over appeals of orders of several administrative
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trative agencies are reviewed by the courts. 8 5 Congress justified its
choice of the court of appeals as the initial forum for judicial review
under section 106(a) on two grounds: the appeals courts' experience in
reviewing orders of other administrative agencies and the House-Senate
conference committee's conclusion that initial appellate court review
would result in greater protection of the rights and security of the alien
seeking review. 8 6 Because section 106(a) is somewhat vague 87 in
specifiying exactly which INS orders are within the appeals courts' exclusive jurisdiction, the courts have undertaken to interpret it and its legislative history on a number of occasions.
1. Section 106(a) of the Act
Congress' stated intent in enacting section 106(a) was to "[c]reate a
single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation . . . of aliens from the United States .... 88
The need for a single form of review arose out of exploitation of the
existing review procedure by aliens intent on frustrating their legitimate
deportation. 89 The existing procedure allowed declaratory and habeas
corpus review, 90 as well as injunctive relief 9 ' of final orders of deporta92
tion, resulting in a virtually unlimited appeal process.
The right of an alien in custody to petition for habeas corpus is
preserved by section 106(a)(9). 9 3 Such review is not limited to the

courts of appeals.9 4 In order to curtail dilatory appeals, however, section 106(c) 9 5 limits the circumstances under which appeals to deportation orders may be taken. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is
required before an alien may seek habeas corpus or statutory review
pursuant to section 106(a). 96 A petitioner is required to disclose
whether the deportation order affecting him has been upheld in a prior
judicial proceeding; petitions challenging orders which have been judiagencies and was adopted as the method for controlling review of INS determinations of
deportability under section 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 105a(a).
85. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 (1982).
86. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2972.

87. See Tai Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772, 778, n.3 (2d Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1017 (1967). See generally Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators
Who Won't, 63 COL. L. REV. 787, 795-796 (1963).

88. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2966.

89. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., IstSess. 22-23, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2967-68.

For a documented example of the delay tactics

referred to in the House Report, see United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Director, INS,
634 F.2d 964, 973-977, app. (5th Cir.) cert.denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981).
90. See Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 U.S. 929 (1954) mem., aff'g, 206 F.2d 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1953).
91. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
92. See Marcello, 634 F.2d at 967 n.1.
93. 8 U.S.C. § I105a(a)(9) (1982).
94. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2973.

95. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(c) (1982).
96. Id.
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cially upheld will not be entertained. This limitation applies to both
97
statutory review and habeas corpus.
2.

Judicial Interpretation of Section 106(a)

The Supreme Court has handed down several decisions addressing
the breadth of appellate court jurisdiction under section 106(a).98 The
Court's first case to address a jurisdictional question arising under section 106(a) was Foti v. INS. 99 Foti addressed whether INS denials of discretionary relief in proceedings in which a final order of deportation is
entered come under the statutory grant of appellate court jurisdiction in
section 106(a).
In an opinion by ChiefJustice Warren, the Court acknowledged that
the phrase "final orders of deportation" in section 106(a) is susceptible
to varying interpretations and therefore turned to the Act's legislative
history to resolve the ambiguity.10 0 Foti recognized that Congress' purpose in providing a single statutory form of review was to curtail dilatory
appeals. The Court deemed this purpose best served by broadening the
court of appeals' jurisdiction under section 106(a) to include all determinations made during and incident to administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to section 242(b).10 '
The holding of Foti expressly excluded the question of whether judicial review of a Board of Immigration Appeals' refusal to reopen deportation proceedings was included under section 106(a). 10 2 Giova v.
Rosenberg 10 3 subsequently answered the question affirmatively in a brief
memorandum opinion. The next case appearing before the Court which
involved the application of section 106(a) illustrated that the Giova hold04
ing was a logical extension of Foti.
In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 10 5 the trend of broadening circuit court
jurisdiction under section 106(a) established by Foti and Giova was
97. Id. See generally Note, The Forum forJudicial Review of Administrative Action: Interpreting Special Review Statutes, 63 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1983).
98. See Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963); Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964), mem.
revg, 308 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1962); Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
99. 375 U.S. 217.
100. Id. at 224-5. The Court accepted statements made on the House floor during
debates by three Congressmen who were "knowledgeable in deportation matters" as indicating that Congress knew that determinations of deportability and rulings on discretionary relief were commonly made in the same administrative proceedings. Id. at 223-24; see
105 CONG. REc. 12728 (statements of Reps. Walter, Lindsay and Moore). The Court
based its analysis of legislative purpose on the HouseJudiciary Committee report concerning section 106(a). Id. at 224-25; see H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23,
reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2967.

101. 375 U.S. at 229.
102. Id. at 231. The Court stated that the question of refusal to reopen hearings is
somewhat different than determinations made during the hearings, because the determination of refusal to reopen is not made in the proceedings entering the final orders of
deportation.
103. 379 U.S. 18 (1964), mer., revg, 308 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1982).
104. See Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 217 (1968).
105. Id. at 206.
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halted. The issue in Cheng Fan Kwok was whether INS refusals of discretionary relief, not entered in the course of proceedings conducted under
section 242(b), come within section 106(a). 10 6 Neither Foti nor Giova
was held to be controlling, and the question of construction presented
was remarked to be much closer than in either of those cases. 10 7 The
Court rested its decision on the lack of any language in section 106(a)
itself to indicate that the statutory judicial review process was to extend
beyond determinations made during and incident to proceedings conducted under section 242(b). Reliance was also placed on the lack of
any intent to so extend section 106(a) in the legislative history. 10 8
The narrow holding of Cheng Fan Kwok sets forth that section
106(a)
only applies to judicial review of determinations made in proceedings
conducted under section 242(b), including determinations made incident to motions to reopen those proceedings.' 0 9 Several circuit courts
decided jurisdictional questions to which section 106(a) was urged to
apply subsequent to Cheng Fan Kwok. A majority of those courts held
that petitions for relief "not inconsistent with" 100 final orders of deportation (rather than those which posed a direct attack on such orders)
were not within the jurisdictional grant of section 106(a).'" The Third
Circuit, however, read Cheng Fan Kwok as holding that section 106(a)
covered only those issues that could be raised in section 242(b) proceedings.1 12 In INS v. Chadha, 113 the Court resolved the conflict among the
appeals courts. The appeal in Chadha involved a challenge to the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2), which provided that the House of
Representatives could overturn INS decisions entered pursuant to proceedings conducted under section 242(b)."1 4 Chadha expressly adopted
the test espoused by the majority of the circuits which had ruled on the
issue and concluded that matters on which the validity of the final order
is contingent are included within the appellate court jurisdiction granted
by section 106(a). 15
106. Id. at 207-8. Petitioner was a seaman who had deserted his ship and remained
unlawfully in the United States. In deportation proceedings conducted pursuant to
§ 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), he conceded deportability, but was granted permission to
leave the United States voluntarily. After failing to depart, petitioner was ordered to surrender for deportation, at which time he requested a stay of deportation while he applied
for discretionary relief from the order.
107. Id. at 211.
108. Id. at 213-15. For a review of immigration law at the time section 106(a) was
enacted, see Note, Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the

Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760 (1962).
109. Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 216.
110. Id. at 213 (quoting Tai Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772, 777 (1966)).
111. See Pilapil v. INS, 424 F.2d 6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908 (1970); Tai Mui
v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772 (1966) cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1017 (1967); Haitian Refugee Center
v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Jean v. Nelson,
727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984); Waziri v. INS, 392 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1968).
112. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1981).
113. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The implications of the Chadha holding are discussed in
Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984).
114. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1981).
115. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 938. Several cases appeared before Chada which determined the application of section 106(a) by applying the test of whether an appeal stating
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Expansion of Habeas Corpus

Changes in the availability of habeas corpus resulting from the redefinition of the phrase "in custody" have the potential of substantially
increasing the use of the habeas writ as a vehicle for review of deportation orders." 6 At the time section 106 was enacted, custody as applied
to habeas corpus meant physical detention.11 7 That definition was substantially broadened by two subsequent Supreme Court cases. In Jones
v. Cunningham," 18 the Court held that a person on parole was in custody
for habeas purposes. Then, in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 1 9 a person
free on his own recognizance was held to be in custody and therefore,
eligible to sue out a writ of habeas corpus. Jones set forth the test stating
that persons subject to governmentally imposed restraints not shared by
the general public satisfied the custody requirement for habeas corpus
relief. 120 Hensley applied the Jones standard to find that a person free on
his own recognizance was subject to sufficient restraints to be eligible
for habeas corpus because he could be ordered to appear at any time or
2
place by a court of competent jurisdiction.' '
In United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Director, INS, the Fifth Circuit,
citing Hensley, held that an alien subject to a final order of deportation
was in custody for habeas purposes. 1 22 Marcello challenged the validity
of a final order of deportation through habeas corpus proceedings.
Although noting that the use of habeas corpus in this fashion defeated the
purpose of section 106(a), the Fifth Circuit went on to determine the
merits of Marcello's challenge to the deportation order. 12 3 A situation
similar to Marcello occurred in Daneshvar v. Chauvin, 124 decided by the
Eighth Circuit. The court again held that the existence of an outstanding order of deportation was a sufficient restraint on liberty to make
habeas corpus relief available. 12 5 The Eighth Circuit, however, conconstitutional grounds poses a direct challenge to the validity of the final order of deportation. See Pilapil v. INS, 424 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1970); Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028 (9th
Cir. 1979); Ferrante v. INS, 399 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1968).
116. See Marceto, 634 F.2d at 967; Daneshvar v. Chauvin, 644 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir.
1981). See generally Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1985).
117. See Marcetto, 634 F.2d at 967.
118. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
119. 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
120. Jones, 371 U.S. at 242.
121. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351.
122. Marcetlo, 634 F.2d at 971. The petitioner in Marcello was perhaps the ultimate
example of a litigant engaged in dilatory tactics. Marcello's habeas corpus petition followed nearly 30 years of litigation in the courts of the United States and Italy. The Fifth
Circuit included a history of Marcello's attacks on his deportation orders in two appendices to its opinion. See Marcello, 634 F.2d at 973-79.
123. 634 F.2d at 972.
124. 644 F.2d 1248, 1249 (1981). Daneshvar had admitted his deportability during
deportation proceedings, and was granted permission to leave the United States voluntarily. Rather than leaving within the time allowed, he moved to reopen the deportation
proceedings. The writ of habeas corpus was filed after Daneshvar was arrested and jailed
for failing to leave. His release on bail was ordered by the district court which held that it
had jurisdiction over the actions of the INS in taking Daneshvar into custody, but nojurisdiction to review the validity of Daneshvar's final orders of deportation.
125. Id. at 1251.
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strued section 106(a)(9) as only creating district court habeas jurisdiction when the petitioner's challenge does not directly attack the validity
of a final order of deportation. 126 By having statutory reviewand habeas
corpus apply to mutually exclusive situations, this holding preserves the
integrity of the single statutory form of review intended in section
27
106(a). 1
D. Analysis
In reaching its decision in Salehi,' 2 8 the Tenth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court constructions of section 106(a), as set forth in Foti, Giova, Cheng Fan Kwok and Chadha. The Tenth Circuit first found that
under Foti, Giova and Cheng Fan Kwok, it did not have exclusive jurisdiction of petitioners' asylum and due process claims because those claims
did not constitute direct attacks on the validity of the final orders of deportation against the petitioners. The court then separately applied the
129
standard developed in Chadha.
Application of the Chadha standard also yielded the result that section 106(a) did not apply to the petitioners' claims. The rationale was
that, even if successful, the petitioners would be entitled only to a hearing to determine their eligibility for asylum; therefore, the validity of the
final orders was not contingent on the success of their claims.' 3 0 The
court also pointed out that a subsequent finding that the petitioners
were eligible for asylum would not overturn the deportation order,
31
rather it would constitute collateral relief from the order.1
From a factual perspective, Salehi and Cheng Fan Kwok bear a close
resemblance to one another. It is not surprising that their holdings are
also in accord. The consistency of outcomes in Salehi of the separate
applications of the Chadha and Cheng Fan Kwok standards is also not surprising, considering that the Supreme Court set out to achieve a result
in Chadha which was in accord with Cheng Fan Kwok. This observation
leads to the conclusion that the Salehi decision could have been based on
Chadha or Cheng Fan Kwok without losing its force of reason.
A broader issue raised by the Salehi decision is how effective it is in
preserving the congressional intent of curtailing dilatory appeals to deportation orders. Admittedly, the Salehi holding does provide for an extra level of judicial review, which superficially appears to thwart the
purpose of section 106(a). In addition, Salehi could open the door to
evasion of the statutory review procedure by the use of habeas corpus.
There are, however, considerations which support the Tenth Circuit's
holding in Salehi.
126. Id. See also United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F.Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Te Kuei Liu v. INS, 483 F. Supp. 107 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
127. See supra text accompanying note 83.
128. Salehi, 796 F.2d at 1286.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 109-111.
130. Salehi, 796 F.2d at 1291.
131. Id.
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The Salehi holding is rather narrow. The types of challenges to
which section 106(a) does not apply are limited to (1) applications for
relief collateral to the final deportation order and (2) procedural attacks
on INS practices. Respecting collateral challenges to final deportation
orders, the Supreme Court decision in Cheng Fan Kwok held that such
challenges were intended by Congress to be outside the application of
section 106(a), foreclosing any appellate court discretion in the matter.
Procedural attacks are of a sufficiently limited class that they do not provide a significant opportunity for delay oriented appeals. Procedural attacks are limited because they apply only to allegations that INS
practices of general application are unconstitutional; section 106(a) pre132
sumably applies to appeals of procedural rulings in individual cases.
The Salehi court avoided deciding whether section 106(a)(9) should
be construed as limiting district court habeas jurisdiction to those claims
not directly attacking deportation orders. The court noted that in Pilapil 133 it had suggested in dicta that section 106(a)(9) would permit
direct attacks on deportation orders. The court also noted that there
was authority to the contrary provided by Daneshvar.134 Refusal to decide the issue in Salehi, coupled with the recognition that prior Tenth
Circuit authority is not binding, leaves the court free to decide the question entirely on its own merits in a future case.
III.

THE RULE 4(F) EXPANSION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
NECESSARY THIRD PARTIES:

QUINONES 1. PENNStYLVANIA

GENERAL INSURACE CO.

A.

Facts

In an action commenced in the state court system of New Mexico,
Quinones, a New Mexico resident, filed a claim for damages against
Penn General under an uninsured motorist policy.1 35 The claim arose

out of an automobile accident that occurred in Texas between plaintiff
and Mowad, a resident of Texas. Penn General removed the suit to the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, and filed a
third-party complaint under Rule 14136 for subrogation against appellee
Mowad. Mowad was served in Texas, pursuant to Rule 4()1 3 7 at a point
approximately forty miles from the federal court in Las Cruces, New
Mexico. The district court dismissed the complaint against Mowad on
his motion asserting that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. 138 Quinones appealed several evidentiary rulings and Penn General appealed
the dismissal of the complaint against Mowad.
132. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1033 (5th Cir. 1982). For a
discussion of due process in deportation proceedings, see Verkuil, A Study of Immigration
Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1141 (1984).
133. 424 F.2d 6, 8-9 (10th Cir. 1970).
134. 644 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1981).
135. Quinones v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1986).
136.
137.
138.

FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1169.
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The Tenth Circuit's Holding

The district court had disallowed testimony from several of the
plaintiff's witnesses ruling that an adequate foundation had not been
laid to establish the relevance of the testimony. 139 The Tenth Circuit
upheld all of the trial court's rulings noting that it had not abused its
discretion in making them. 140 Turning to the jurisdictional issue, the
Tenth Circuit held that by providing for service of third-party defendants at locations outside the forum state, but within 100 miles of the
federal courthouse, Rule 4(f) did confer personal jurisdiction over
Mowad, even though he did not have any contacts with the forum state
(New Mexico). 141

C.

Background

Before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Judiciary Act of 1789142 limited the in personam jurisdiction of the
federal district courts to parties served within the district.14 3 Rule 4(f)
as first promulgated provided for service "anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held."' 144 The rule
was amended in 1963 to provide for service of necessary third parties
brought pursuant to Rules 14 and 19 who could be served within 100
miles of the forum court.
1. The Purpose Underlying the Amendment of Rule 4(f)
The advisory committee's note pertaining to the 1963 amendment
14 5
of Rule 4(1) provides insight into the intentions behind the change.
In enacting the provision in Rule 4(f) that provides for extended service
on necessary third parties (regardless of whether such parties are within
the forum state), the stated intent was to "promote the objective of enabling the court to determine entire controversies."' 14 6 Considering
modern travel and communication capabilities, the advisory committee
felt that extension of the territorial range in which service is allowed
would not work hardship on parties summoned.1 4 7 The advisory committee's note has been interpreted as intending that Rule 4(f) extend the
139. Id. at 1170-1172.
140. Id. The Tenth Circuit relied on several of its cases for the elementary proposition
that a trial court ruling on evidence will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of
discretion. See, Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir.
1984); Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-Mcgee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1149 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978) (this case contains a veritable gold mine of evidentiary propositions along with Tenth Circuit supporting authority for them at 1148-1149).
Because the evidentiary rulings in Quinones are neither controversial nor of first impression, they will not be discussed further.
141. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1177.
142. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
143. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
144. See Mississippi Publishing v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 443 (1946).
145. See Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1979); Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968).
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) advisory committee's note.
147. Id.
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territorial limits of district court jurisdiction, rather than merely providing for service on necessary third parties already subject to the jurisdic14 8
tion of the forum state.
2.

Power to Determine the Limits of Federal Process

Determining that the intent in amending Rule 4(f) was to effect an
increase in district court jurisdiction resulted in a need to decide
whether the Supreme Court, acting through its advisory committee, had
the power to make such a change. 149 In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 150 the Supreme Court was faced with the analogous question
of whether, under the original version of Rule 4(f), it had the power to
promulgate a rule expanding district court service of process to encompass the whole of the forum state.
The Court, after pointing out that Congress could provide for service of process anywhere in the United States, 151 analyzed whether Congress had delegated that power to the Court. 15 2 The Act of June 19,
1934, authorizing the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provided that the rules were not to "abridge, enlarge or modify"
the substantive rights of litigants. 153 In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,' 54 the
court held that the proper test for a rule's validity was not whether it
might affect a litigant's rights, but whether it was directed at regulating
"the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law ....
155 Mississippi Publishing expressly recognized that
rules fixing jurisdiction did affect the rights of litigants, but relied on
Sibbach as allowing such abridgments if incidental to the operation of a
procedural rule. 156 The Court then emphasized that a rule specifying a
federal court's jurisdiction did nothing to change the rules of decision
148. See Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250, 251 ("If
the amendment had done no more than [permit personal service on necessary third parties
already subject to the court's jurisdiction] . . .it would have accomplished little."). Id. at
251-52.
149. See Id. at 252; Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416.
150. 326 U.S. 438, 440.
151. Id. at 442 (citing Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925);
United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1879); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838)). For a critical review of the constitutionality of nationwide service of process in diversity cases, see Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Territorial
Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520 (1963).
152. Alississippi Publishing, 326 U.S. at 445.
153. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
154. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
155. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Petitioner in Sibbach had originally brought a personal
injury action against respondent. Petitioner had been jailed for contempt by the district
court for refusing to submit to a court ordered medical examination for the purpose of
determining the extent of her injuries. Id. at 6-7. Her only challenge to the district court's
action was based on her claim that FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a), providing for medical examinations when physical condition is an issue, was invalid because it abridged her substantive
rights. Id. at 11. The Court rejected this claim, but ordered the petitioner's release based
on plain error, because the remedy for failure to submit to a medical examination ordered
pursuant to rule 35(a), provided in FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), does not include punishment
for contempt. id. at 16.
156. Mississippi Publishing, 326 U.S. at 445-446 (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11-14).
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used by the court to adjudicate the parties' rights. 157
Interpreting
Rule 4(f) as extending federal court jurisdiction over necessary third
parties beyond the forum state's borders presents an issue not covered
in Mississippi Publishing. The doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 158 has
been interpreted as requiring that federal court in personam jurisdiction
in an ordinary diversity case be determined with reference to state
law. 159 In Arrowsmith, Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit,
held that in the absence of an overriding federal statute, rule or policy, a
federal district court cannot assert personal jurisdiction over a party in a
diversity case, unless a court of the forum state would assert its jurisdiction over that party. 16 0 The Arrowsmith court did not express an opinion
on whether Rule 4(f) would be limited by the forum state's jurisdictional
bounds. 161
3.

Constitutional Due Process

By providing for service of process beyond the borders of the forum
state, Rule 4(f) raises questions of due process under the minimum contacts standard set forth in InternationalShoe v. Washington. 16 2 The specific
issue is whether the area of minimum contacts analysis remains confined
to the forum state, or expands beyond its borders. In Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 1 63 the Second Circuit held that out of
state service on a party pursuant to Rule 4(f) is valid if the state in which
service is made could serve the party there. This is equivalent to extending the area of minimum contacts analysis to the whole of the state
of service.
The Second Circuit pointed out that limiting the minimum contacts
area to the forum state would result in Rule 4(f) providing a federal
court with nothing more than a method of utilizing the forum state's
long-arm statute. 16 4 Under such a limitation, the amendment of Rule
4(f) would have little effect, since Rule 4(e) expressly provides for service pursuant to a state's long-arm statute.' 65 The Second Circuit also
found support for extension of the minimum contacts area by reading
the advisory committee's note as intending to expand district court
jurisdiction. 166
Expansion of the minimum contacts area relating to Rule 4(f) was
157.

Id. (citing Guarantee Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)).

158. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
159. See Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (1963).
160. Id. at 223. The court held that federal law would only come into play in a challenge to the state's ability to constitutionally assert jurisdiction. Id. at 222.
16 1. Id. at 228 n.9. See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the
In PersonamJurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CI. L. REV. 569, 623 (1958).
162. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
163. Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 252, 253 (1968).
The court indicated that out of state service pursuant to Rule 4(1) would "very likely" be
valid only on persons over which the state of service would actually choose to exercise
jurisdiction. Id. at 252.
164. Id. at 252.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 142-145.
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deemed necessary by the Fifth Circuit in Sprow v. Hartford Insurance
Co. 167 The court again found that confining Rule 4(f) to providing for
service on parties having sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state would reduce it to a duplicate of Rule 4(e). 168 The Fifth Circuit
also adopted the Second Circuit's interpretation of the purpose behind
16 9
the amendment of Rule 4(f).
Sprow and Coleman differ on the extent of expansion of the minimum
contacts area under Rule 4(). The Sprow court held that a third party
must have minimum contacts with either the forum state or the 100 mile
bulge to be amenable to service under Rule 4(). 170 Keeping the minimum contacts area coincident with the territory of the forum's jurisdiction was put forth as the most logical method of adapting the
InternationalShoe due process test to the expansion of diversity jurisdiction beyond state borders. 17 1 The Fifth Circuit also noted that it might
be fundamentally unfair to subject certain parties served in the 100 mile
bulge area to the jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in another state.
The court's example of such a party was a corporation which had an
agent for service of process in the state containing the bulge, but no
contact with the forum state or the 100 mile bulge other than the agent's
temporary presence within the bulge. 172 Under the Second Circuit's
standard set forth in Coleman, since the same hypothetical corporation's
agent could be served by a court in the state containing the bulge at any
place within its borders, the agent could be served in the bulge by a
federal district court of the forum state.
D.

Analysis

Sprow and Coleman were reviewed with approval in Quinones as reach17 3
ing what the Tenth Circuit considered to be the proper result.
Rather than relying on those holdings, however, the jurisdictional reach
of Rule 4(f) was analyzed according to basic principles.
The Tenth Circuit first relied on Sibbach v. Wilson as authorizing
Congress to delegate rule-making power to regulate federal court procedure to the Supreme Court. 174 The extension of common-law jurisdiction brought about by Rule 4(f) as originally promulgated was then
75
reviewed. 1
As the first case to consider the provisions of the original Rule 4(f),
167. 594 F.2d 412, 416 (1979).
168. Id. at 417.
169. See supra text accompanying note 162. The purpose behind the expansion in jurisdiction was seen by both the Second and Fifth Circuits as that expressed in the advisory
committee's note to Rule 4(f). Coleman, 405 F.2d at 250 n.3; Sprow, 594 F.2d at 417. See
also supra text accompanying notes 142-145.
170. 594 F.2d at 416.
171. Id. See also Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963, 77
HARV. L. REV. 601, 633 (1964).
172. Sprow, 594 F.2d at 416.
173. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1173-1174.
174. Id. al 1174 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. at 9-10).
175.

Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1174-1175.
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Mississippi Publishing1 76 was recognized as a road map for interpreting
the extension of district court jurisdiction by a procedural rule of the
Court. The central proposition of Mississippi Publishing, that Rule 4() accomplished a congressionally authorized enlargement of district court
territorial jurisdiction,' 77 was used to dispose of appellee's contention
that Rule 4() merely described effective service, rather than the extent
of the district court's in personam jurisdiction.1 7 8 To extend Mississippi
Publishing to the case at bar, reference was made to the advisory committee's note to ascertain that the 1963 amendment of Rule 4(f) was intended to expand the district court's territorial jurisdiction.179 By direct
analogy with Mississippi Publishing, the Tenth Circuit then held that the
intended expansion of territorial jurisdiction was accomplished by Rule
4(f).1 8 0
The Tenth Circuit became the first circuit court to go through a
reasoned discussion to support the holding that the Rule 4(f) extension
of diversity jurisdiction beyond state lines is not precluded by the Erie
doctrine.' 8 ' As suggested inArrowsmith,18 2 the Tenth Circuit held that if
a federal rule or policy so requires, a federal district court may assert
83
personal jurisdiction in a diversity suit where a state court would not. 1
Reading Rule 4(f) in the light of its underlying federal policy of ending
controversies with one lawsuit, convinced the court that there was suffidistrict
cient justification for finding that the rule did extend the federal
84
court's jurisdiction beyond the borders of the forum state.'
The Quinones court followed Sprow by interpreting International Shoe
as requiring minimum contacts with the territory of the forum, rather
than minimum contacts with the forum state.' 85 This reading mandated
the finding that the area of minimum contacts analysis for Rule 4(f) is
the forum state plus the 100 mile bulge area. Since Rule 4(f) is of federal origin, it makes sense to dispense with the concept that federal
court territorial jurisdiction is inextricably linked to one or more states'
borders. The Tenth Circuit's well-reasoned finding that the Erie doc86
trine does not compel adherence to state law in the case of Rule 4()'
makes this conclusion all the more compelling. Thus, the interpretation
176. 326 U.S. 438. See supra text accompanying note 147.
177. Mississzppi Publishing, 326 U.S. at 444-445. Mississippi Publishingalso addressed the
question of whether the Court's interpretation of Rule 4(f) as expanding territorial jurisdiction was inconsistent with FED. R. Civ. P. 82 which prohibits construing the rules to
extend or limit district court jurisdiction. The Court in Mississippi Publishing found no inconsistency by interpreting Rule 82 as applicable to subject matter jurisdiction and venue,
but not personal jurisdiction. Id. at 445. The appellee in Quinones advanced the same inconsistency argument, which the Tenth Circuit rejected in the same way. Quinones, 804
F.2d at 1175 n.6.
178. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1175.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 142-145.
180. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1175.
181. Id. at 1176-1177.
182. 320 F.2d 219, 226 (1963). See also supra text accompanying notes 155-156.
183. Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1177.
184.
185.
186.

Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 142-145.
Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1177. See also Sprow, 594 F.2d at 416-417.
See supra text accompanying notes 177-180.
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of the minimum contacts area in Quinones is preferable to that adopted in
Coleman. 18 7 There may be little practical difference between the two
standards because of the limited application of Rule 4(0,188 and the
scarcity of situations in which a party served in the bulge area would
have minimum contacts with the state of service, but not the bulge itself.
IV.

RES JUDICATA EFFECT OF STATE COURT DISMISSAL OF SECTION

1983
A.

ACTION: DEVARGAS V. MONTOYA

Facts

The facts underlying plaintiff's claim were simple: DeVargas alleged that guards at the New Mexico State Penitentiary beat him while
he was incarcerated there.' 8 9 The procedural aspects of the ensuing litigation complicated matters considerably. The alleged beating occurred
on September 21, 1976. On July 6, 1977, DeVargas filed a complaint in
New Mexico state court alleging violation of his civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983190 by the state of New Mexico, its Department of Corrections, and several prison guards and officials.19 1 Following defendants'
motion to dismiss, DeVargas allowed the case to lie dormant for 28
months. 19 2 On August 5, 1980, plaintiff filed a pleading, entitled
"Amended Complaint," altering the parties' defendant, referring by
name to seven parties listed as "Does" in the original complaint and
adding several claims for relief. The New Mexico Court of Appeals
found the new complaint to be original and dismissed it on the defense's
assertion of the statute of limitations.' 9 3 DeVargas then turned to federal district court, filing a complaint containing claims brought in state
court, several new claims, and alleging that the decisions on the statute
of limitations by the state court of appeals were in error.194 Defendants
again raised the statute of limitations and the district court dismissed the
action, relying on the doctrine of claim preclusion in adopting the state
court's determination that the action was time-barred. On appeal to the
Tenth Circuit, DeVargas claimed denial of due process and equal protection in the state court proceedings and asked for review of both the
state court rulings that the action was time-barred and the federal dis187.

See supra text accompanying note 159.

188. See Quinones, 804 F.2d at 1173.
189. DeVargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 1986).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
191. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1247.
192. Id. The delay was allegedly due to an oral agreement with defense counsel to
enter into settlement negotiations.
193. DeVargas v. State ex rel New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 97 N.M. 447, 640 P.2d
1327 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
194. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1248.
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95

The Tenth Circuit's Holding

Ruling on the applicability of claim preclusion, the Tenth Circuit
first held that the state court dismissal of the action as time-barred con196
stituted a determination on the merits for purposes of res judicata.
The Tenth Circuit found no error in the state court's choice of the applicable statute of limitations; therefore, the state court's refusal to extend
the statute of limitations was entitled to res judicata 19 7 effect in federal
court.19 8 Finally, the court ruled that the plaintiff had not been denied

due process or equal protection rights in the state courts.'
C.

99

Background
1. Res Judicata
State court judgments are generally entitled to full faith and credit

in federal court.2 0 0 In determining whether to grant preclusive effect to

a state court judgment under the doctrine of res judicata, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 directs a federal court to refer to the preclusive effect that the
judgment would have in the state of its issuance, 20 ' Resjudicata is not
available to dispose of an issue or claim in federal court when the party
against whom it is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue or claim in state court. 20 2 The operation of resjudicata
is also inapplicable when a federal statute expressly or impliedly effects a
195. Id. DeVargas alleged that defendants were estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations because of alleged concealment and misrepresentation of information needed
by DeVargas to cure defects in his original complaint. Id. at 1248. See generally Note, Citizen
Trust and Government Cover-up: Refining the Doctrine of Fraudulent Concealment, 95 YALE L.J.
1477 (1986). DeVargas also appealed the dismissal of claims added to the complaint when
it was filed in federal district court. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1248.
196. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1250.
197. The general term "resjudicata" will be used here to encompass the more specific
terms of "issue preclusion," referring to the effect of ajudgment in barring relitigation of
an issue previously adjudicated, and "claim preclusion," which bars relitigation of matters
which should have been raised in a prior action. See Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 376, n.l (1985); Migra v. Warren City School Dist.,
465 U.S. 75, 77, n.l (1984).
198. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1252-54.
199. Id. at 1254-56.
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) provides in relevant part that "[J]udicial proceedings [of
any state] shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
... as they have ...

in the courts of such State ...." The phrase "every court within the

United States" has been construed to include the federal courts. See Huron Holding Corp.
v. Lincoln Mine Operations Co., 312 U.S. 183, 193 (1941); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40
(1938).
201. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). See also supra text accompanying notes
19-20, 26-29,
202. The Court has recognized the full and fair opportunity to litigate exception in
both the issue preclusion and claim preclusion contexts. With regard to issue preclusion,
see Allen, 449 U.S. at 95; Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); BlonderTongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29
(1971). With regard to claim preclusion, see Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456
U.S. 461 (1982).
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partial repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1738.203
Because of the importance of the federal interest in protecting individual civil rights and a perception that state courts are an inadequate
forum for their protection, it has been suggested that full faith and
credit need not be given to all state court decisions in section 1983 actions. 20 4 In Allen v. McCurry,20 5 the Supreme Court found that section
1983 does not contain an implied repeal of the 28 U.S.C. § 1738 doctrine of preclusion. The Court reached its conclusion of no implied re-

peal because Congress, in enacting section 1983, did not manifest a
clear intent to override either 28 U.S.C. § 1738 or the common law doc206
trine of res judicata.
Although rejecting the implied repeal theory, the Allen Court reaf-

firmed the policy of not allowing preclusion to be asserted against a
party who did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or
issue in state court. 20 7 This policy was stated more generally in Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corporation,2 0 8 where the Court held that ajudgment
not meeting the requirements of due process could have no resjudicata
effect. The Court reasoned that since a state could not grant preclusive
effect to a judgment not meeting the requirements of due process, 28
U.S.C. § 1738 prevented the federal courts from allowing such a judg20 9
ment to be used preclusively.
Implicit in the due process prerequisite to the application of res
judicata is the requirement that the judgment for which preclusive effect
is sought was an adjudication on the merits of the claim or issue in question. A prior judgment need not have reached the substantive issues of
203. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468, Allen, 449 U.S. at 98-99. See generally Smith, Full Faith
and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal,63 N.C.L. REV. 59, 110-111 (1984).
204. See, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 509 n.14 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Currie, ResJudicata: The ,eglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 317 (1973); Averitt,
FederalSection 1983 Actions after State Court Judgment, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 191 (1972); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1335-43 (1977).
205. 449 U.S. at 90, 99 (1980). Several of the circuit courts have suggested that in
section 1983 actions, claim preclusion should not bar federal court litigation of a federal
issue which was not, but could have been, raised in a prior state court proceeding. See
Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327 (2nd Cir. 1977); Lombard v. Bd. of Education, 502 F.2d
631 (2nd Cir. 1974); Mack v. Florida Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970). The
Allen Court noted but expressed no opinion on this narrow exception. Allen, 449 U.S. at 97
n.10. Another narrow exception to the operation of claim preclusion occurs when a plaintiff has multiple claims, some of which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts, arising out of a single set of facts. The Court has stated that an implied partial
repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 might be appropriate in such a case (depending on the congressional intent in conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction) if state preclusion rules
would bar subsequent litigation of the exclusively federal claims. Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 386 (1985).
206. 449 U.S. at 99. The Court required a clear intent to repeal 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
because repeals by implication are disfavored. Allen, 449 U.S. at 99 (citing Radzanower v.
Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)).
207. Allen, 449 U.S. at 101.
208. 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982).
209. Id. Kremer was a Title VII action brought in federal court after dismissal of administrative and state court claims arising from the same alleged injury: the defendant's failure to rehire petitioner after being layed off, when several other employees laid off by
defendant were rehired.
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a claim in order to have provided a full and fair opportunity for the parties to litigate their claims. 2 1 0 In Angel v. Bulington,2 1 the Court stated
that an adjudication declining to reach the ultimate substantive issues
may be sufficient to bar a subsequent action attempting to relitigate the
same issues.
2.

Due Process Limits on Full Faith and Credit

As suggested above, the fourteenth amendment due process clause
assures that state judicial proceedings which do not afford a party a full
and fair opportunity to litigate can not be used preclusively against that
party. 2 12 For situations covered by 28 U.S.C. § 1738, Kremer provides
that state court proceedings which meet the minimum due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment qualify for full faith and
2 13
credit.
Satisfaction of fourteenth amendment due process is determined in
an individual case by examining the procedures available to a state court
litigant in prosecuting his claim. 21 4 The Court has stressed that due
process does not require a uniform type of procedure, nor is there a
single model by which due process is to be judged. 21 5
Due process review of state court judgments in order to determine
their preclusive effect arises frequently when a litigant attempts to pursue federal claims subsequent to state court litigation arising out of the
same alleged injury. 2 16 When this occurs, the federal courts assess
whether a litigant had a full and fair opportunity to pursue his federal
claim in the state court. 21 7 A determination that the state court pro210. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) ("the State certainly accords
due process when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural
or evidentiary rule, citing Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 351 (1909)).
211. 330 U.S. 183, 190 (1947). Due process must be satisfied in an action dismissed on
procedural grounds in order for itto bar a subsequent attempt to relitigate claims arising
out of the same facts. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 204-05. See also Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481.
213. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482. The Court pointed out that under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 1, a full and fair opportunity to litigate entails
the procedural requirements of due process. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483 n.24 (citing Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348 (1948)); Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S.
522, 524 (1931); Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 30 (1917). Interpreting the
purpose underlying the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 as implementing the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, provided the connection between due process and full faith and credit.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483 n.24 (citing Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430
(1943)); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938).
214. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483; Kiowa Tribe v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985).
215. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 650 (1972); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 885, 895 (1961); NLRB v.
Mackay Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938).
216. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1975).
217. See Marrese, 470 U.S. at 380. Even if there was not a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the federal claim in state court, issue preclusion may still apply to issues common
to the federal and state claims. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466-67, 485; Marrese, 470 U.S. at
381-82, 385. See generally Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63

N.C.L.
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59 (1984).
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ceedings did not provide an opportunity to litigate the federal claim
does not necessarily mean that full faith and credit can not bar the federal action. Assuming that state preclusion rules would bar the subsequent federal action if it were brought in state court, analysis of whether
28 U.S.C. § 1738 is expressly or impliedly partially repealed by the federal statute creating the claim must be undertaken. 2 18 Even though adherence to full faith and credit may bar a federal action without the
plaintiff having had any previous opportunity to pursue the federal
claim, the rigorous "implied repeal" test, which developed in cases
2 19
is applied. 2 20
where the federal claim was litigated in state court,
3.

Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Section 1983 Actions

In section 1983 actions, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires that federal
courts refer to state law in deciding issues not provided for by federal
law. 22 1 There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to section
1983; therefore, state law must provide the statute of limitations. Prior
to Wilson v. Garcia,2 22 courts entertaining section 1983 claims adopted
the statute of limitations applicable to the most analogous state cause of
action. 2 23 The Tenth Circuit's approach before Garcia was to analyze
the nature of the claim's allegations and adopt the statute of limitations
applicable to the comparable state action. 2 24 In Garcia, the Supreme
Court resolved the inconsistencies in the methods used by courts to determine the most similar state action, holding that state statutes of limitations applicable to personal injury actions were to apply to section
1983.225

One important exception to the adoption of state statutes of limitations in civil rights actions is the proviso that the state limitations statute
218. See Marrese, 456 U.S. at 383.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 201-02.
220. See Marrese, 456 U.S. at 381, 385. As the Court noted in Marrese, since most state
preclusion laws do not apply where the subject matter jurisdiction of the initial court was
not competent to entertain the subsequent claim, the potential for unfairness due to the
rigor of the "implied repeal" test is lessened. Id. at 382.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) provides that federal statutory civil rights shall be enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States. If the laws of the United States are
deficient in an area, state law is to be used, as long as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
222. 471 U.S. 261 (1985). For a discussion of the applicability of tort remedies to fill in
the gaps in federal section 1983 law, see Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1479 (1987).
223. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
224. See Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1983) (section 1983
action alleging wrongful confinement in a mental hospital); Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc.,
580 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1978) (action for wrongful discharge from employment).
The Third Circuit followed the same procedure as the Tenth Circuit. See Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 900-903 (3d Cir. 1977). The Seventh Circuit rejected the case-by-case determination method in favor of a uniform
limitation for all claims founded on federal civil rights statutes. See Beard v. Robinson, 563
F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1977).
225. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 276. See generally Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Rico Actions
after Wilson v. Garcia, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 529 (1987).
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not be applied if it is inconsistent with federal law. 22 6 Inconsistency is
to be determined by reference to the Constitution, federal statutes, and
the policies underlying both. 2 2 7 Despite the acknowledged "broad
sweep''228 of section 1983, the Court, in Robertson v. Wegmann, 2 29 held
that there is nothing in section 1983 or its underlying policies that is
230
inconsistent with a state law causing an action to abate.
The Court has required that federal courts honor not only state
statutes of limitations, but also state rules on how the statutes are to be
tolled. In Board of Regents v. Tomanio,2 3 1 a New York rule providing that
the statute of limitations is not tolled during a period when a plaintiff
pursues a related but independent claim, was upheld to bar a federal
action resting on section 1983.232 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist applied the test that absent an inconsistency between the New
York tolling rule and the policies underlying section 1983, the state toll233
ing rule was to be followed in federal court.
Relying on the foundation laid by Robertson,2 34 the Court noted that
there is no presumption or policy in federal law disfavoring state policies of repose. 2 35 Recognizing that the two principal purposes behind
section 1983 are deterrence and compensation, 23 6 the Court found that
the New York rules of repose did not hamper a plaintiff's ability to obtain relief under section 1983.237

In contrast to the uniform federal acceptance of state tolling rules,
several circuits determine the accrual of actions according to federal
law. 2 38 The Tenth Circuit views accrual as analogous to tolling, and in
226. This exception is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). See supra note 217. See
also Robertson, 436 U.S. at 589-90; cf UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966)
(choice of statute of limitations in suits on collective bargaining contracts under the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)).
227. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454, 465 (1975).
228. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971)).
229. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
230. In Robertson, the Court was concerned with a Louisiana statute that caused the
deceased plaintiff's action to abate because he was not survived by a spouse, parents, siblings or children. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 587.
231. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
232. Id. at 480 (plaintiff was a practicing chiropractor in New York, but was unable to
pass a state board examination required by a newly enacted state statute. Plaintiff claimed
that the state's refusal to waive the examination requirement, in view of her professional
experience, violated due process of law).
233. Id. at 485-86.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 222-26.
235. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 488.
236. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590-91.
237. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 488. The Court also rejected the argument that federal uniformity in the area of tolling rules was of sufficient importance to justify striking down New
York's rule. Id. at 489.
238. See Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984); Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d
377, 382 (2d Cir. 1983); Perez v. Laredo Junior College, 706 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984); Gowin v. Altmiller, 663 F.2d 820, 822 (9th Cir.
1981); Bireline v. Seagondollar 567 F.2d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842
(1979).
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Clulow v. Oklahoma,2 39 held that questions of accrual are to be answered
by reference to state law. The court reached its holding by reading
Tomanio and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency 24 0 as directing federal

courts to follow state rules relating to limitations statutes as well as the
statutes themselves, unless there is an inconsistency between the state
24 1
rules and federal law.
D. Analysis
In DeVargas v. Montoya, 242 the Tenth Circuit, was faced with a federal action issue, as well as a collateral attack on prior state court adjudications. Defenses of resjudicata and failure to comply with the statute of
limitations were asserted to bar both actions. The court analyzed the
actions separately, and that format will be adopted here as well.
1. Original Federal Action
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in dismissing DeVargas' complaint, never reached the substantive issues; 2 43 therefore, the first task
before the Tenth Circuit was to determine whether the state court dismissal constituted an adjudication on the merits. 2 44 Following the well
established rule that a federal court refer to the preclusive effect ajudgment would have in the state of its issuance, 24 5 the Tenth Circuit determined that the dismissal was a judgment on the merits pursuant to state
law, 24 6 and that New Mexico adhered to the majority rule that claim
preclusion was applicable both to issues which were and which could
have been raised.2 4 7 These basic issues were dispensed with essentially
in summary fashion by the court.
DeVargas's only serious challenge to the applicability of resjudicata
was that the federal courts' independent powers to determine issues
such as tolling, waiver and estoppel somehow avoided the mandate of
full faith and credit. 24 8 In disposing of this argument, the Tenth Circuit

undertook a brief analysis of the extent of independent federal power.
It was noted that the Supreme Court settled conclusively that state toll239. 700 F.2d 1291 (1983).
240. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
241. See Clulow, 700 F.2d at 1300. In Clulow, the Tenth Circuit went on to find that
there was no conflict between the section 1983 or its underlying policies and Oklahoma's
accrual rules. Id. at 1301.
242. 796 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1986).
243. DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections. 97 N.M. 447, 642 P.2d
166 (1982)"
244. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1249.
245. See supra text accompanying note 197.
246. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1249. The court cited Campos v. Brown, 85 N.M. 684, 515
P.2d 1288 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) and Adams v. United Steelworkers of America, 97 N.M.
369, 640 P.2d 475 (1982) for their holdings that a dismissal with prejudice constitutes an
adjudication on the merits.
247. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1251. The court relied on First State Bank v. Muzio, 100
N.M. 98, 666 P.2d 777 (1983) as authority for New Mexico's view on applicability of claim
preclusion to issues which could have been raised.
248. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1250.
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Oklahoma was cited for the proposition that a claim of estoppel due to
concealment of information 250 was a question of accrual, and also for
the Tenth Circuit's position that accrual is determined according to state
25
rules. '
Because of the well established consistency between state policies of
repose and section 1983,252 no investigation concerning the success
with which state rules fulfilled the purposes of federal statutes was undertaken in DeVargas. The Tenth Circuit assumed the existence of independent federal power to determine issues of tolling or accrual, but
promptly discarded the idea of using such federal power, because claim
preclusion barred relitigation of the New Mexico decision, refusing to
recognize any extension of the limitations period. Presumably, in a case
where a party was able to put forth a claim in which the consonance of
state law and federal statute was not settled, the court would have undertaken an analysis similar to that in Tomanio 253 to determine whether
the state law was inconsistent with a federal statute or its underlying
purpose.
2.

Collateral Attacks on State Court Proceedings

DeVargas attacked the state court proceedings based upon theories
of inconsistency with federal law and denial of due process. The inconsistency theory was grounded mainly upon Gunther v. Miller,25 4 which
was claimed to establish a binding determination that the four-year New
Mexico statute of limitations applied to section 1983 actions. 2 55 Gunther
was distinguished by the Tenth Circuit as holding only that the two-year
limitations period of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act 2 56 did not
apply.

2 57

After the dismissal of plaintiff's action by the New Mexico courts,
the Supreme Court handed down Garcia v. Wilson, 2 58 which mandates
use of state personal injury limitations statutes in section 1983 actions.
Retroactive application of Garcia would not have helped DeVargas, who
needed the four-year statute for miscellaneous actions, not the threeyear personal injury statute. 25 9 Probably because of the court's interest
249. Id. at 1252. See supra text accompanying note 221.
250.
251.

See supra note 7.
See supra text accompanying notes 235-37.

252. See supra text accompanying note 229.
253. 446 U.S. 478. See supra text accompanying note 230-33.
254. 498 F. Supp. 882 (1980).
255. The four-year statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978), is a catch-all provision for
miscellaneous actions not covered by specific limitations statutes. Other relevant statutes
of limitations are the two-year period set by the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-4-12 (1978), and the three-year period for personal injury actions, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978).
256.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12 (1978).

257. Gunther, 498 F. Supp. at 882-83.
258. 471 U.S. 261 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 218-21.
259. See supra note 251. See also Note, Wilson v. Garcia and Statutes of Limitations in Section
1983 Actions. Retroactive or Prospective Application?, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. (1986).
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in allowing a chance for DeVargas to obtain an adjudication of his secmerits, the Tenth Circuit declined to
tion 1983 claim on its substantive
260
apply Garcia retroactively.
In situations where the Tenth Circuit has determined state statutes
of limitations applicable to federal laws, part of their analysis has cen26 1
The DeVargas court
tered upon analogous state court holdings.
agreed with the plaintiff's assertion that the characterization of an action, brought in federal court under federal law for purposes of determining the applicable state statute of limitations, is a question of federal
law. The burdens of a federal policy not disfavoring state statutes of
repose 26 2 and the existence of a state court decision on the exact federal
issue before the federal court, in a circuit with a policy of actively adopting state court rulings on statute of limitations matters, proved to be
insurmountable to DeVargas.
The Tenth Circuit made it clear that the state court determination
carried great weight. Consequently, the inconsistency claim was again
26 3
dismissed summarily with no analysis of underlying federal purpose.
Such deference to state law characterizations of federal statutes is consistent with the Supreme Court decisions in UA W v. Hoosier CardinalCorporation,264 Tomanio and Marrese. Hoosier stated the general proposition
that state law characterizations of federal law ought to be respected by
26 5
Tomanio applied
federal courts, unless inconsistent with federal law.
this proposition by accepting state tolling rules as part of state statutes
of limitations. 2 66 Marrese indicated the potential ultimate extent of deference to the states by postulating that a plaintiff might be precluded by
a prior state court action from bringing a subsequent exclusively federal
claim.

2 67

DeVargas's due process attack on the state court proceedings was
very broad, challenging every adverse decision made by the New Mexico
268
The Tenth Circuit stated the general proposition that full
courts.
faith and credit required only that the minimum procedural require69
Therefore, no detailed analysis of
ments of due process be satisfied. 2
plaintiff's constitutional claims was pursued. The court pointed out that
plaintiff was responsible for the delays in the state court litigation. Because of the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals, it
was within the court's power to refuse to address the constitutionality of
260. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1253.
261. Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380, 386 (10th Cir. 1978). See supra text
accompanying notes 219-20.
262. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980). See supra text accompanying note 231.
263. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1254.
264. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
265. Id. at 706.
266. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 483.
267. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 386
(1985).
268. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1244-45.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 208-13.
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2 70
the state court proceedings in areas other than the due process issue.

V.

A.

INTERVENTION OF RIGHT:

FDIC v. JENNINGS

Facts

This case arose out of the insolvency of Penn Square Bank, N.A.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed receiver for Penn Square and filed suit against former bank officers and
directors for breach of fiduciary duty. 2 7 1 The complaint was amended
to join the accounting firm Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co. ("Peat
Marwick"), which was charged with negligence and breach of contract
arising out of an audit of Penn Square's financial statements. 272 Penn
Square's holding company, First Penn Corporation, moved to intervene
in the action pursuant to rule 24(a)(2), 2 73 alleging both derivative and
direct injuries arising from Peat Marwick's audit of Penn Square. 2 74 The
derivative claims sought recovery for losses incurred by First Penn as a
shareholder in Penn Square. The direct claims alleged losses suffered
by First Penn in transactions with Penn Square which resulted from First
Penn's reliance on Peat Marwick's audit of Penn Square. 27 5 The district
27 6
and First Penn appealed. 2 77
court denied the motion to intervene
B.

The Tenth Circuit'sHolding

The Tenth Circuit disposed of the threshold issue of mootness,
which arose because of the settlement between the FDIC and Peat
Marwick, holding that the settlement did not moot every issue of the
action. 2 78 First Penn dropped its derivative claims; therefore, the Tenth
Circuit addressed intervention with respect to the direct claims only.2 79
After reviewing the merits of First Penn's intervention claim in detail,
the court upheld the district court's dismissal of the motion to
2 80
intervene.
270. DeVargas, 796 F.2d at 1245. The Tenth Circuit based its lack ofjurisdiction over
this appeal regarding the constitutionality of the state court decision on District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), and 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982),
which grants exclusive jurisdiction over Constitutional appeals from state courts to the
Supreme Court.
271. FDIC v. Jennings, 816 F.2d 1488, 1490 (10th Cir. 1987).
272. Id.
273. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
274. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1490.
275. Id.
276. FDIC v. Jennings, 107 F.R.D. 50 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
277. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1490. FDIC and Peat Marwick settled while First Penn's appeal was pending.
278. Id. at 1491. The court viewed settlement in a case where an appeal to intervene
was pending as posing a particular risk of injustice to a party with a legitimate intervention
claim.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1493. The court approved both the verdict and reasoning employed by the
district court.
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C.

Background

Rule 24(a)(2) sets out standards for intervention by right. 28 ' The
prospective intervenor must claim an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he must be so situated
that the disposition as a practical matter will impede his ability to protect
the interest. 28 2 Intervention is warranted under these circumstances unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties
to the action. 2 83 The analysis in intervention cases typically proceeds by
analyzing the interest, its impairment, and the adequacy of representa28 4
tion as separate, but frequently related, elements.
1.

Intervenor's Interest in the Action

Since the 1966 amendment of Rule 24(a)(2) to its present form,
courts have had a difficult time formulating a precise test for the interest
necessary to justify intervention. 28 5 Soon after the rule's amendment,
the Tenth Circuit adopted what appeared to be a narrow view, requiring
that the interest be specifically legal or equitable. 2 8 6 The Supreme
Court, in Donaldson v. United States,2 87 used an approach similar to the
Tenth Circuit's, refusing intervention to an applicant who did not have a
"significantly protectable interest. ' 288
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit's attempt to clarify the meaning of
interest, the District of Columbia Circuit, in Nuesse v. Camp 28 9 allowed an
applicant asserting a general interest to intervene. The applicant in Nuesse was the Wisconsin Banking Commissioner, who sought to intervene
in an action between the American State Bank, a Wisconsin chartered
bank, and the United States Comptroller of the Currency. 290 American
challenged the Comptroller's approval of a national bank's application
281. See, FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), which provides for intervention:
[W]hen the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
282. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1343 (10th Cir. 1978).
283. See National Farm Lines v. ICC, 564 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1977).
284. See .Vatural Resources, 578 F.2d at 1344-45; Jet Traders Inv. Corp. v. Tekair, Ltd.,
89 F.R.D. 560 (D. Del. 1981).
285. See Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1420
(1984) ("[Clourts have enjoyed little success in attempting to define precisely the type of
interest necessary for intervention"); Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849,
850 n.3 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[A]ttempts to add content to Rule 24(a)(2)'s 'interest' requirement have met with questionable success."); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
286. See Toles v. United States, 371 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1967).
287. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
288. Id. at 531. Donaldson sought to intervene in an action between his former employer, Acme, and the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS sued to enforce summons
served on Acme and its accountant requiring them to testify on matters relating to Donaldson's tax liability. Donaldson moved to intervene in the action, citing his potential tax
liability as a sufficient interest. Id. at 518-19.
289. 385 F.2d 694 (1967).
290. Id. at 698.
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to open a branch office. The Commissioner's asserted interest was
based on his authority to enforce the state banking laws relied on by
American in bringing its action. 2 9 1 The District of Columbia Circuit rejected a narrow approach in defining "interest," choosing instead to rely
on the purpose behind the interest test.2 92 The court perceived that the
interest test is "primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by
involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with
'2 93
efficiency and due process."
Despite the Tenth Circuit's apparently limited formulation of what
constitutes a sufficient interest, it has made statements tending to suggest a broader outlook than the "specific legal or equitable interest" test
would suggest. 29 4 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,2 9 5 the Tenth Circuit allowed intervention
by a party with a general economic interest in the action. In Natural
Resources, the Natural Resources Defense Council sued to prevent the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Agency (NMEIA) from licensing a uranium mill
operated in New Mexico by United Nuclear Corporation without first
preparing environmental impact statements. 2 96 Kerr-McGee Nuclear
Corporation moved to intervene, claiming an interest in the action because it operated a uranium mill in New Mexico, and had an application
29 7
for renewal of its operating license pending before the NMEIA.
Describing the nature of interest meriting intervention, the Tenth
Circuit stated that the applicant need not have a direct interest in the
outcome of the action.2 98 The court relied on Cascade Natural Gas Corp.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,299 a Supreme Court case where the state of
California was allowed to intervene in an antitrust action because the
30 0
outcome of the action might affect California's natural gas supply.
The specific legal or equitable interest test was not abandoned in Natural
291. Id.
292. Id. at 700. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note ("persons materially
interested in the subject of an action ... should be joined as parties so that they may be
heard and a complete disposition made.") and FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee's note ("the amendment draws upon the revision of... [Rule 19] and the reasoning
underlying that revision."). See generally, Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to
Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061 (1985).
293. Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700.
294. See National Farm Lines, 564 F.2d at 384 ("Our court has tended to follow a somewhat liberal line in allowing intervention."); Dowell v. Board of Ed. of Okla. City, 430 F.2d
865, 868 (10th Cir. 1970) ("[I]ntervention ...should be freely granted so long as it does
not seriously interfere with the actual hearings.").
295. 578 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1978).
296. Id. at 1342-43.
297. Id. at 1344. The American Mining Congress also sought to intervene on behalf of
its members who were or might become uranium mill operators in New Mexico.
298. Id.
299. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
300. Id. The Court had previously ordered that El Paso Natural Gas divest itself of the
Northwest Pipeline Corporation. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S.
651, 662 (1964). The instant action was to assure that Pacific Northwest, a natural gas
supplier subsidiary of Northwest Pipeline, be restored to a competitive position in the
California Market. Cascade, 386 U.S. at 132.
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Resources; however, Kerr-McGee's interest was of a more general and attenuated nature than previously merited intervention in the Tenth
30
Circuit. '
2.

Impairment of Interest

The existence of an interest justifying intervention and the issue of
its impairment are not entirely separable. 30 2 Finding an interest has
been conditioned on whether it would be impaired by the outcome of an
action. 30 3 One issue analyzed solely in terms of impairment is the effect
of stare decisis on a prospective intervenor's ability to protect his interest in a subsequent action.
Stare decisis was recognized as a sufficient "practical disadvantage" 30 4 to warrant intervention of right soon after the 1966 amend06
ment of the Federal Rules. 30 5 Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States 3
was an early case on stare decisis impairment. The issue before the Atlantis court was one of first impression, a factor upon which considerable
emphasis was placed in finding impairment based primarily on stare decisis. 30

7

The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the issue of first impression, in

the present action, would be a part of any subsequent claim brought by
Atlantis (the applicant for intervention); therefore, the principal action
constituted a trial on the merits of Atlantis's claim in a practical
sense.

30 8

The applicability of stare decisis to a finding of impairment of inter301. In Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416 (1984), the
Tenth Circuit adopted the underlying purpose analysis of Nuesse, 385 F.2d 694. This
adoption indicated conclusively that the specific legal or equitable interest criterion would
not be applied literally. One court has noted that intervention is granted more freely in
"cases seeking injunctive relief where the grant of the relief sought would have broad
social or economic ramifications" than in actions seeking damages. See Jet Traders Inv.
Corp. v. Tekair, Ltd., 89 F.R.D. 560 (D. Del. 1981). The Tenth Circuit's decisions seem to
line up roughly along this guideline. Thus, intervention was allowed in Natural Resources,
where the intervenor (American Mining Congress) represented many companies which
might be impacted if the Natural Resources Defense Council prevailed. See supra text accompanying notes 291-93. Intervention was also granted in Sanguine, 736 F.2d at 1416,
where the applicant was an Indian tribe affected by a proposed change in the interpretation of oil and gas leases of Indian lands by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Sanguine, 736
F.2d at 1417-18. But see Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849 (1981), where
intervention was denied. The applicant leased land containing coal deposits to Rosebud.
The royalty rate of the lease was tied to the royalty rate that the Department of Interior
charged Rosebud on federal lands. Rosebud was disputing an increase in the federal royalty rate and subsequently, the applicant claimed an interest since its royalty rate was tied
to the federal rate. Rosebud, 644 F.2d at 849-50.
302. See Natural Resources, 578 F.2d at 1345.
303. Id. at 1344 (citing Cascade, 386 U.S. at 135-36).
304. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
305. See Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 826-29 (5th Cir. 1967);
Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 702.
306. 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
307. Atlantis, 379 F.2d at 826. At stake in Atlantis was the ownership of a number of
reefs off the coast of Florida. The United States sued Acme, apparently at Atlantis' behest,
to enjoin Acme from building structures on the reefs without first obtaining a permit from
the United States Corps of Engineers. Atlantis was also interested in building on the reefs,
and moved to intervene. Id. at 820-21.
308. Id. at 826.
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est has been addressed in a number of cases since Atlantis, resulting in
refinement and definition of the doctrine. 30 9 Federal courts do not see
stare decisis as having any significant impairment effect in cases where
the precedent would only have persuasive effect in a subsequent action
by the applicant for intervention.3 10 Lack of identity of legal issues between the action and the applicant's claim, and federal court actions
based on state law, where the applicant's action would be tried in state
court, are two principal areas where the stare decisis effect does not rise
311
to the level of practical impairment.
3.

Inadequate Representation of an Intervenor's Interest

A footnote in a 1972 Supreme Court case set the standard for evaluating whether the existing parties to an action adequately represent the
proposed intervenor's interests. In Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of
America, 3 12 the Court stated that an applicant need only show that the
representation of his interest by existing parties may be inadequate. 3t 3
The Court went on to say that the applicant's burden in showing inade3 14
quacy is minimal.
Prior to Trbovich, at least one court had put the burden of showing
adequate representation by existing parties on those parties opposing
intervention.3 15 Even after Trbovich, a few courts continued to indicate a
preference for saddling parties opposing intervention with the burden
of showing adequate representation.

16

In National Farm Lines v. ICC,3 1 7

the Tenth Circuit was encouraged by a petitioner for intervention to put
309. See Jet Traders, 89 F.R.D. at 569; CRI, Inc. v. Watson, 608 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.
1979); Natural Resources, 578 F.2d at 1341; Florida Power Corp. v. Granlund, 78 F.R.D. 441
(M.D. Fla. 1978); Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 1977); New York Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of New.York, 516 F.2d 350 (2nd Cir.
1975); Martin v. Travelers Indem. Co. 450 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1971).
310. See Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954 (1977);Jet Traders, 89 F.R.D. 560.
311. Jet Traders, 89 F.R.D. at 569.
312. 404 U.S. 528 (1972). The Secretary of Labor brought suit under § 482(b) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1982), to
overturn the results of a United Mine Workers election. Trbovich had initiated the complaint with the Secretary, which led to the suit. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 529. The Court
pointed out that the Secretary's statutory duty included protecting both the rights of individual union members and the public's interest in fair union elections. Intervention was
granted because the Court perceived the Secretary's dual protectorate role could conceivably result in a conflict. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538-39.
313. Id. at 538 n.10.
314. Id.
315. Auesse, 385 F.2d at 702.
316. See Corp. v. Merchandise Mart of S.C., Inc., 61 F.R.D. 684 (D. S.C. 1974); Holmes
v. Government of Virgin Islands, 61 F.R.D. 3 (D. St. Croix 1973).
317. 564 F.2d 381 (10th Cir.1977). National Farm Lines sought to intervene in an
action brought by the National Motor Freight Traffic Association against the ICC, attacking the constitutionality of ICC regulations on motor carriers. Id. at 382. In assessing the
adequacy of the ICC's representation of National Farm Lines (National Farm Lines
benefitted from the reduced competition brought about by the regulation), the Tenth Circuit emphasized the significance of business knowledge and experience possessed by private concerns which a government agency would not have, and the conflict inherent in the
agency's desire to protect the interest of both the private business and the general public.
Id. at 383-84.
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the adequacy of representation burden of proof on the opposing
party. 3 '8 The court followed Trbovich, holding that the burden of show31 9
ing inadequate representation, though slight, was on the petitioner.
Perhaps the more significant effect of Trbovich is its characterization
of the intervening applicant's burden as minimal. The Tenth Circuit's
interpretation of minimal was defined in Natural Resources as finding inadequacy of representation unless "there is no way to say that there is
no possibility that . . . [the interests of the intervenor and the existing

parties] will not be different ....',320 Having parties before the court in
order to bind them to the result as well as to protect prospective intervenors' rights, were relied upon in Natural Resources as favoring a near
32 1
presumption of inadequacy of representation.
D. Analysis
Since First Penn dropped its derivative claims against Peat Marwick,
the Tenth Circuit only addressed whether First Penn's direct claims enti3 22
tled it to intervene in the action between the FDIC and Peat Marwick.
The court narrowed its analysis to the interest and impairment requirements for intervention after a brief discussion of the FDIC's ability to
323
represent First Penn's interests in the direct claims.
In advancing its direct claims, First Penn would have had to prove
that, absent Peat Marwick's alleged negligence in preparing the audit, it
would not have entered into certain loan transactions with Penn
Square. 3 24 On the other hand, the FDIC's case did not depend on First
Penn's injuries allegedly incurred in reliance on the audit. Because the
facts clearly indicated at least a partial lack of overlap in the FDIC's and
First Penn's claims, the finding of inadequacy of representation depended on the facts and required no legal analysis.
Turning to the issue of interest in the action, in particular, how to
assess a prospective intervenor's interest, the court adopted the previous Tenth Circuit requirement that the interest asserted be a specific
legal or equitable one, but stated that the test of interest is determined
3 25
with reference to the purpose underlying the interest requirement.
This juxtaposition of propositions, that had been considered inconsistent by the District of Columbia Circuit in Nuesse,3 26 indicates that the
Tenth Circuit's specific legal or equitable interest requirement does not
mean specific in the sense of reliably known at the time of intervention;
but rather it means specific in the sense of legally cognizable within the
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 383.
Id.
Natural Resources, 578 F.2d at 1346.
Id.
Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1491.
Id.
Id. at 1490-91.
Id. at 1491. See supra text accompanying notes 282 and 289.
Neusse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (1967).
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context of the action in which intervention is requested.3 27
While the divergence of issues worked to First Penn's favor on the
adequacy of representation issue, too great a divergence would preclude
finding that First Penn had a sufficient interest in the litigation to justify
intervention. The court did note that First Penn's claim would interject
new issues into the action.3 2 8 In keeping with the recognized interrelationship between interest and impairment, however, the Tenth Circuit
addressed impairment before determining how burdensome the introduction of new issues would be; essentially implying that a finding of
serious impairment would justify a larger burden on the existing
3 29
litigation.
The divergence of issues worked to First Penn's detriment in the
impairment analysis. The court noted that stare decisis could be sufficient to satisfy the impairment requirement; however, the difference in
First Penn's and the FDIC's theories of recovery minimized the stare
decisis effect. Furthermore, Oklahoma law controlled First Penn's
claims, again minimizing the precedential impact of a federal court
330
ruling.
After finding the impairment of First Penn's claims to be minor, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the district court's finding that the introduction
of new issues would burden the existing action substantially. Citing the
burden on the existing action, the lack of stare decisis impairment, and
the divergence of the issues, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
determination that First Penn was not entitled to intervene in the
33l
action.
VI.
A.

SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION:
WILLIAMS V. LIFE SAVINGS AND LOAN

Facts

Plaintiff Pamela Williams, acting pro se, filed a Title VII employment discrimination action against her former employer in the Colorado
federal district court.3 3 2 Defendant was a Rockford, Illinois bank, over
which the court could not obtain personal jurisdiction. 333 The complaint was filed on April 26, 1985 and dismissed sua sponte by the district court on April 29, 1985, for lack of personal jurisdiction over Life
334
Savings.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 285-93. Cf. Allard v. Frizzell, 536 F.2d 1332
(10th Cir. 1976) (intervention denied to applicants whose interest in the action was an
interest held by the public generally which would not be impeded by the disposition of the
action).
328. See supra text accompanying note 306. See also NaturalResources, 578 F.2d at 1345.
329. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1492. See also supra text accompanying note 306-07.
330. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1492. See also FDIC v. Jennings, 107 F.R.D. 50, 55 (1985).
331. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1493.
332. Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 1986).
333. Id.

334. Id.
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B.

The Tenth Circuit's Holding

The Tenth Circuit noted that the complaint was dismissed before
the date on which the defendant was required to appear or file a responsive pleading. 33 5 In a per curiam opinion, the court held that a district
court's power to inquire sua sponte into its jurisdiction over the parties
is not to be exercised until a point is reached in the proceedings where a
defaultjudgment could be entered. 3 36 Because Life Savings was not in
default when the complaint was dismissed, the district court's dismissal
33 7
was reversed, and the case remanded.
C.

Background
1.

Sua sponte dismissal

In certain circumstances, the limited jurisdiction of the federal
courts and considerations of judicial economy and fairness permit sua
sponte dismissal by the court. A federal court must dismiss an action
over which it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, regardless of
whether or not the issue is raised by the parties.33 8 A judgment rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is void,3 3 9 and therefore, legally ineffective. 3 40 Because subjectmatter jurisdiction can never be conferred by waiver or consent, 3 4 1 and
a judgment rendered in its absence has no legal effect, a court is bound
3 42
to inquire into its jurisdiction before rendering judgment.
Sua sponte dismissal for lack of prosecution is supported by the policy of judicial efficiency. In Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 3 4 3 the Supreme
Court upheld a district court's dismissal of a dilatory plaintiff's action. 344 Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan recognized that a court's
authority to control its docket was inherent, and governed by the control
necessary to "achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
335. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a) provides that:
[a] defendant shall serve his answer within 20 days after the service of the summons and complaint upon him, except when service is made under Rule 4(e) and
a different time is prescribed in the order of court under the statute of the United
States or in the statute or rule of court of the state.
336. Williams, 802 F.2d at 1203. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a) provides for the entry of a default
judgment "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to
appear by affidavit or otherwise ......
337. Williams, 802 F.2d at 1203.
338. See Mansfield, C. & L. Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 11l U.S. 379, 382 (1884); Fiedler v.
Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 78-79 (9th Cir. 1983).
339. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 457, 465 (1873) (a court must have "jurisdiction of parties and cause" for its
judgment to be valid); Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1971).
340. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S.
433 (1940).
341. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 243 (1934).
342. See Mansfield, 11l U.S. at 382.
343. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
344. Id. at 633.
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3 5
cases." 4

With respect to sua sponte dismissal, defects in personal jurisdiction differ from defects in subject-matter jurisdiction and action by a
plaintiff which merits dismissal. Waiver of personal jurisdiction by a
party may be made as expressly provided for in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, or otherwise, subject only to due process protections.
Waivers which are not dependent on the Federal Rules include voluntary appearance,3 4 6 and consent to subject oneself to the in personam
34 7
jurisdiction of a particular court by contact.
Under Rule 12(h)(1), 3 4 8 the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction
is waived if it is not raised in a pre-answer pleading or in the answer
itself. Thus, lack of personal jurisdiction is a personal defense, as is the
assertion of the statute of limitations to bar an action. 34 9 Because it is
incumbent upon a party to raise the issue of defective jurisdiction over
50
his person, the court is precluded from raising it on his behalf.3
A court's assertion of its lack of personal jurisdiction over a defendant in order to dismiss a plaintiff's action is distinguishable from a
court's dismissal of an action for reasons which are within the plaintiff's
control. In the case of jurisdiction, a sua sponte dismissal requires the
court to assert another party's rights against the plaintiff, on behalf of
the party. In the case of dismissal for failure of prosecution, the court is
essentially asserting its own right to control its docket against the
351
plaintiff.
2.

Lack of Personal Jurisdiction in a Default Judgment

Default judgments present a peculiar situation in which a court may,
sua sponte, inquire into its jurisdiction over the parties. In determining
whether to enter a default judgment, a court has discretion to consider
whether it would later have to set it aside on a motion by the defendant.3 52 Under Rule 60(b),35 3 a court may relieve a party from a final
judgment in a number of situations, one being when the judgment is
345. Id. at 630-31. Justice Harlan characterized the power of a court to dismiss an
action for lack of prosecution as having ancient origins in both law and equity. Id.
346. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
347. See National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964); Petrowski
v. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 350 U.S. 495 (1956) (personal jurisdiction may be conferred
by consent of the parties).
348. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(l).
349. See Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1969); Wagner v. Fawcett Publications, 307 F.2d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963) (the statute of
limitations is a personal defense, which is waived if not raised by the defendant).
350. See Zelson, 412 F.2d at 56. Improper venue is also subject to waiver, and the court
is similarly unable to dismiss an action sua sponte for want of venue. See Concession Consultants, Inc. v. Mirisch, 355 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1966).
351. See supra text accompanying note 341.
352. See Henry v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 3 F.R.D. 142 (W.D. Va. 1942). A defendant's attack on a default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction may be made collaterally in the court rendering the judgment, or in a court where the plaintiff attempts to
enforce the judgment. See Covington Industries, Inc. v. Resintex, A. G., 629 F.2d 730, 73334 (2d Cir. 1980).
353. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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void. The relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary in a number of situations; however, there is no discretion in granting relief from a void
3 54
judgment.
The certainty that a default judgment rendered by a court lacking
3 55
personal jurisdiction is void and will be vacated in a collateral attack,
provides ample justification for a court's sua sponte inquiry into its jurisdiction over the parties before entering a default judgment. 35 6 After
refusing to enter a default judgment, a court has the option of dismissing the action 35 7 or transferring the action to a district court where
3 58
it could have been brought.
D. Analysis
The law on dismissal of actions pursuant to a court's sua sponte
inquiry into its jurisdiction over the parties is well established in both
cases and policy. 35 9 The district court's dismissal of Williams's action

prior to the time of the defendant's default 3 60 was clearly inconsistent
with the prevailing rule that a court not dismiss an action (other than an
action for a default judgment) for lack of personal jurisdiction on its own
motion. As might be expected from the well settled state of the law, the
Tenth Circuit spent few words on its reversal of the dismissal.
Any lasting significance that Williams might enjoy will be due to the
court's dicta approving the transfer of actions which have reached the
default judgment stage with defects in personal jurisdiction. 3 6' By
transferring rather than dismissing default judgment actions, both judicial economy and the interests of litigants are advanced. Judicial economy benefits because the action is transferred to a forum where it may
be pursued on its merits or dismissed with prejudice. Litigants benefit
for much the same reason. Defendants' interest in disposing of litigation expeditiously is furthered because the court to which the action is
transferred has the power to make a final disposition of the action.
Plaintiffs bringing actions with such blatant jurisdictional defects as
those in Williams are usually acting pro se. 36 2 By transferring the action,
a court may further the naive plaintiff's ability to obtain an adjudication
of his claim on its merits. Alternatively, in the case of a pro se plaintiff
whose action is brought for reasons other than obtaining relief from a
354.

See V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 n.8 (1979); Austin v. Smith, 312

F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1955).
355. See Covington Industries, 629 F.2d at 732.
356. See First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Bezema, 569 F. Supp. 818, 819 (S.D. Ind.
1983); Bross Utils. Serv. Corp. v. Aboubshait, 489 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 n.3 (D. Conn.
1980).

357. See, e.g., Bross Utilities, 489 F. Supp. at 1368.
358. See Bezema, 569 F. Supp. at 821.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 344-46.
360. See Williams, 802 F.2d at 1202.
361. Id. at 1203.
362. Prisoners are a common example of pro se plaintiffs. See Brandon v. District of
Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Redwood v. Council of the Dist. of
Columbia, 679 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lewis v. State, 547 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
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legally cognizable injury, transferring the action furthers the public pol36 3
icy of discouraging litigation for its own sake.

CONCLUSION

On the whole, the cases considered in this article serve to increase
the availability of the federal courts to plaintiffs. Superior Oil will enhance
a non-Indian's ability to utilize the federal courts in disputes with Indians when tribal remedies prove inadequate. The holding in Salehi grants
full access to the federal court system to aliens with legitimate complaints about Immigration and Naturalization Service practices, particularly those practices affecting their constitutional rights.3 6 4 Quinones
recognized and furthered the federal policy of resolving controversies in
one action by extending diversity jurisdiction in an area where significant rights are not threatened by the expansion. Williams is perhaps the
clearest expression of the Tenth Circuit's desire to reduce the procedural complexities and resulting inscrutability of the federal courts to
non-lawyers.
DeVargas andJennings do not run counter to the trends of simplifying
litigation and enhancing the accessibility of the federal courts. DeVargas
did deny the plaintiff access to the federal courts; however, he had already had his day in state court. Enforcing the policy of repose serves to
facilitate access to those whose complaints have yet to be heard. Jennings
denied a potential plaintiff access not to the courts in general, but to a
particular action. A major underpinning for the denial in Jennings was
the procedural complexity that would be introduced into the case upon
the plaintiff's intervention.
None of the Tenth Circuit's holdings in these cases are indicative of
a desire to throw open the federal court's doors to all plaintiffs. Rather,
the slight expansions of subject-matter and personal jurisdictional
bounds seem intended and should serve to ease some of the procedural
complexities inherent in accessing and conducting proceedings in the
3 65
federal courts.
John DeSisto

363. Transfer of an action to a forum where jurisdiction over the parties can be perfected may work a hardship on a plaintiff; however, this hardship is inherent in the requirements of due process, not in the transfer policy advocated by the Tenth Circuit. See
generally Burbank, ProceduralRulemaking Under theJudicialCouncils Reform andJudicial Conduct

and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283 (1982).
364. See generally Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1395-99 (1983).

365. For an interesting perspective on federal jurisdiction in general, see Kerameus, A
Civilian Lawyer Looks at Common Law Procedure, 47 LA. L. REV. 493, 495-97, 503-05 (1987).

